Abstract. Based on the collective action model of social networks, this paper analyzes all the Nash equilibrium of them on two typical social networks, i.e. complete graph, star graph, and compares the relationships between the cooperation level of collective action and social control and network size under different influences between nodes and different networks as well.
Introduction
The game among individuals in collective action is embedded in the individual's social networks, so the network structure has a very important influence on collective action (that is, the level of collective cooperation). Research on collective action in the network dates from PRAHL R [1] , the density of application network and centrality of network degree, and other social network parameters of collective action; Yann Bramoullé [2] presents a game model of public goods on social networks, discussing the equilibrium relationship between individual effort and collective welfare in the complete graph, star graph and circle graph; Michael Suk-Young Chwe [3] considered the impact of the strength or the weakness of the network connection on collective action; on this basis, David A. Siege [4] studied the characteristics of individuals with heterogeneous motivation involved in collective action, and network simulation results show that the scale of the network, the large number of weak connections, and the possibility of the individual to play elite, will have an important impact on collective action; finally, Ká roly Taká cs [5, 6] brings the synergistic evolution of social network and collective action into the research on collective action [7, 8] .
In this context, to compare the direct and indirect effects between nodes on the impact of collective action cooperation level on social networks, this paper introduces a collective action model and compares and analyzes the nodes' characteristics of equilibrium and the level of cooperation of the collective action under different types of impacts.
Collective Action Model on Social Network
Consider that the collective of n, denoted by } ,...,
represents the social relationships among collective members, . Each individual provides certain public goods, all members of the collective can use them for free and for the provision of public goods shall pay a certain cost. Under these circumstances, the cost provided by the individual shall be more than the benefit that a single member in the collective who provided public goods, but if all members in the collective provide a certain amount of public goods, its total benefit shall be more than the individual's cost [9] .
Based on the above assumptions, the profits function of individuals participating in the collective action consists of the following components; 
Game rules for individual participating in collective action: ① individuals only play game with their directly connected neighbors; ②Individuals make decisions at same time, and they do not make clear the strategy information of the neighboring nodes in the choice of strategy.
For ease of discussion, this paper only takes into account the situation that the individuals using strategy. As Jackson-Wolinsky [10] research points out, the star graph and complete graph are the main network structures with effectiveness and stability, so many social networks appear as star graph and complete graph form. The loop graph is also a very specialized social networks structure, so this paper will consider the three special networks of collective action, shown in Fig. 1 . In the collective action model, the conditions of individuals choosing strategy of 1
. That is to say, only when the compensation that social control brought in is sufficient to offset the costs of public goods provided for the participation in collective action, individuals will adopt a cooperative strategy to participate in collective action [5] .
The Equilibrium Solution of Collective Action on the Complete Graph
In the complete graph, any node can be The following proposition can similarly be proved.
The Equilibrium Solution of Collective Action on the Star Graph
In the star figure, the central node 
Conclusions
This paper, in consideration of direct and indirect effects among the nodes, proposes the equilibrium solution of an extended model on collective action in three main social networks. Theoretical analysis shows that only the conditions of the direct effects among the nodes has been considered, the collective action model in a social network introduced in social control mechanisms emerges as a state of collective cooperation, with selective incentives as the key to the emergence and maintaining of collective cooperation, and social control mechanisms plays different roles in the different network structures.
